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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RACHEL ARMELINDA CINTRON, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
Case No. 16440 
vs. 
ELMA J. MILKOVICH, 
) 
Defendant and 
Appellant. ) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover monetary damages for 
injuries sustained as a result of a two vehicle collision which 
occurred on February 14, 1976, in Midvale at the intersection of 
Allen and Center Streets. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This personal injury case was tried to a jury before The 
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Third Judicial District Court Judge. 
The jury returned a special verdict which found that the 
defendant, Elma J. Milkovich, failed to keep a proper lookout and 
failed to yield the right of way to the plaintiff, Rachel Cintron 
Dcyle. The jury also found that the plaintiff did keep a proper 
lookout. However, they found she failed to keep her vehicle under 
reasonably safe and proper control and drove at a speed that was 
not safe, reasonable and prudent under the circumstances. 
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Based on those findings, the jury apportioned betw' 
the parties the negligent conduct which proximately caused t 
collision. They found the defendant sixty per cent (60%) ne~ 
and the plaintiff forty per cent (40%) negligent. 
The defendant made a motion for a new trial which; 
denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff-respondent seeks affirmation of the 
Judgment of the lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant's statement of facts is basically co~ 
however, it discusses at great length testimony not pertin~ 
this appeal. Therefore, the respondent submits this stat~~ 
facts. 
On February 14, 1976, at approximately 5:00 p.m., 
plaintiff-respondent, (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff) 
sister, and a friend Lonnie were westbound on Cenrer Street 
Murray, Utah (TR45). Center Street is a four-lane dividedh 
with separate left-hand turn lanes (see Exhibit 1-D, 3-P a~ 
The occupants of the vehicle driven by plaintiff were return 
home from shopping (TR45). Defendant-appellant, (hereinafte 
referred to as defendant), was making a left-hand turn from 
northbound Allen Street to westbound Center Street at the ti 
the collision (TR86 and Exhibit 1-D). This intersection is 
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controlled by two stop signs which control the traffic utilizing 
Allen Street. (Exhibit 1-D and 2-P.) 
Defendant testified that she had accelerated away from 
the stop sign to an approximate speed of 10 miles per hour at the 
point of impact (TR78). Regardless of whether defendant stopped 
or not, plaintiff began to apply her brakes when she saw defendant 
leave the stop sign area and began to pull in front of plaintiff 
(TR4 7) . 
Plaintiff stated that after defendant pulled away from 
the stop sign and began to pull onto Center Street, that she still 
thought defendant would stop and allow plaintiff to pass before 
pulling into the westbound traffic. When it was apparent that 
defendant was not stopping, plaintiff took her foot off of the 
brakes turning her wheel to the right in an attempt to avoid the 
collision (TR47). 
The visibility is quite unobstructed from the stop sign 
through the Rio Grande underpass (TR40, 60 and Exhibit 5-P). 
As plaintiff swerved to avoid defendant's car, the left 
rear portion of the car driven by plaintiff came in contact with 
the left rear portion of defendant's car. Then plaintiff's car 
proceeded up over a curb and across a snow covered lawn before 
coming to rest (TR47). 
Plaintiff was injured in this accident requiring surgery 
(TRSl). Plaintiff incurred medical expenses and loss of income as 
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a result of the impact (TR52, 53 54, 55). 
This appeal centers on the speed and location of e 
vehicles and the duties of the drivers of these vehicles undi 
circumstances. The testimony as to the speed of the plaint!: 
vehicle ranges between 30 and 40 miles per hour (TR46, 60, s 
The posted speed limit was 35 miles per hour. Plaintiff tes: 
that she accelerated to maintain her speed coming up the hiL 
that she accelerated the speed of her automobile as inferr~ 
defendant (TR59). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE QUESTION OF PLAINTIFF'S VEHICLE 
CONSTITUTING AN "IMMFDIATE HAZARD" 
WITHIN THE MEP.NING OF SECTION 41-6-72.10 
(2) UTAH COPE ANNOTATED (1953) IS A 
QUESTION OF FACT, TO BE DETERMINED BY 
THE JURY. 
Section 41-6-72.10(2) Utah Code Annotated (1953) r 
a driver stopped at a stop sign to "yield the right of way"• 
follows: 
(1) Preferential right of way may be indicated 
by stop signs or yield signs as authorized in 
section 41-6-99. 
(2) Except when directed to proceed by a police 
office~, every driver of a vehicle approaching 
the stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked 
stop line, but if none, before entering the 
crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, 
or if none, then at a point nearest the intersecti: 
roadway where the driver has a view of approachini 
traffic on the intersecting roadway before 
entering it. After having stopped, the driver 
shall yield the right of way to any vehicle in 
- 4 -
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the intersection or approaching on another 
roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate 
hazard during the time when such driver is 
moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways. 
This state requires that the defendant yield the right 
of way to the plaintiff's vehicle if it constituted an "immediate 
hazard" to the defendant's vehicle at the time the defendant's 
vehicle was within the intersection. In its special verdict, the 
jury concluded that defendant was negligent in that she failed to 
keep a proper lookout and did not yield the right of way to 
plaintiff's vehicle. Defendant contends that plaintiff's vehicle 
was not an 'immediate hazard' and that, therefore, defendant 
could not be guilty of failing to yield the right of way to 
plaintiff. This position is untenable because the question of 
whether or not plaintiff's vehicle constituted an "immediate 
hazard" is one of fact, and therefore, a matter to be decided by 
the jury. 
The court gave the following jury instructions on 
"immediate hazard": 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
You are instructed that at an intersection where a 
stop sign is erected at one or more entrances 
thereto, the driver of a vehicle facing said 
stop sign is required to stop in obedience thereto 
and yield the right of way to vehicles not so 
obliged to stop, which are within the interse~tion 
or approaching so closely thereto as to constitute 
an immediate hazard; but, said driver having so 
yielded may then proceed and the drivers of all 
other vehicles approaching the intersection on 
said through highway shall yield the right of way 
to the vehicle so proceeding into or across the 
through highway. 
-5-
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INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
You are instructed that an immediate hazard 
exists whenever a reasonably prudent person 
having stopped at the entrance to a through 
highway in obedience to a stop sign, would 
apprehend the probability of colliding with 
an oncoming vehicle on the through highway 
were he then to attempt crossing the said 
through highway. 
The jury heard testimony that the defendant when ar 
stopped at the stop sign could see to the bottom of the hi~ 
under the underpass (TR40). They also heard testimony that,, 
the time defendant pulled away from the stop signn the plai~ 
should have been quite visible to defendant since plaintiff' 
no trouble observing defendant during this same period (TR4o, 
4 7) . 
In Hughes v. Hooper, 431 P.2d 983, 984 (1967), thi' 
court held: 
"The rights and duties of drivers approaching 
intersections are questions dealing with the 
standard of conduct to be expected of a reason-
ably prudent man and are peculiarly a matter 
for the jury. Contributory negligence is therefon 
primarily to be resolved by the trier of facts 
since it involves these same rights and duties. 
It is not to be treated as one of law unless 
the facts and inferences from them are free 
from doubt. If there is doubt, the issue is for 
the jury." 
Similarly, whether defendant was negligent in fail: 
to yield the right of way to plaintiff and whether the pla~ 
vehicle constituted an "immediate hazard" involve these same 
rights and duties. There is evidence supporting the plainti: 
view of the occurrence as well as that of the defendant. W 
was doubt as to the facts and the issue was properly sub~W 
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t 
the jury which found these facts to favor the plaintiff. 
A very similar factual case, Johnson v. Cornwall 
Warehouse Company , 15 U.2d 172, 175, 389 P.2d 710 (1964), 
involved a defendant's vehicle making a left hand turn from a 
stop sign into the path of the plaintiff's vehicle. This court 
stated: 
"In view of the discrepancies in the evidence as to how 
far west of the intersection plaintiff's car was at the 
time defendant driver entered the intersection, it was 
a fact which the jury should have determined whether 
defendant driver proceeded into the intersection with-
out keeping a proper lookout and at a time it was not 
safe to enter." 
It is the duty of this court to view the evidence in a light 
most favorable to plaintiff. (See Johnson v. Cornwall, supra., 
Seegmiller v. Western Men, Inc., 20 U.2d 352, 437 P.2d 892 {1968)). 
There is evidence in the record to support the finding that 
plaintiff was an "immediate hazard." The jury's finding of facts 
should not be overturned simply because there was conflicting 
testimony. 
In Marsh v. Irvine, 449 P.2d 996, 22 Utah 2d 154,157 (1969) 
which also involved an automobile collision, this court said: 
"We agree that the jury should not be allowed 
such unbridled license as to base its verdict 
upon something which would be a physical impossi-
bility. But .... that does not appear to be the 
situation here. It was the jury's prerogative 
to choose the evidence they would believe and 
to place whatever emphasis and draw what~ver 
reasonable inferences therefrom they desired 
so long as they were not wholly inconsistent 
with reason." 
The jury's verdict is not inconsistent with reason and 
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is not based upon something constituting a physical impossij 
There is more than sufficient evidence in the record as to 
and location of vehicles to support the jury's special verd: 
The jury exercised its prerogative to choose the evidence it 
believe and to place whatever emphasis and draw whatever re, 
able inference therefrom it desired. Its decision was thu 
plaintiff's claim had the support of the preponderance of~ 
evidence. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS 
TO THE SUBSTANCE OF A MUNICIPAL 
ORDINANCE. THE DUTY IMPOSED BY 
THIS ORDINANCE WAS ADEQUATELY 
COVERED IN THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS. 
The defendant requested the following instructi~ 
uested jury instruction no. 18): 
"Under the ordinance of Midvale City, it is 
provided that the driver of any vehicle 
traveling at an unlawful speed shall forfeit 
any right of way he might otherwise have. 
If, therefore, you find from the evidence 
in this case that the plaintiff's vehicle 
was being driven at an unlawful speed, then 
I instruct you that the right of way which 
she might otherwise have had at such inter-
section would be forfeited." 
It is the duty of the trial judge to determine whi 
requested jury instructions are applicable to the case. mi 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 51. A requested instructionni 
not be given if the substance of the requested instruction~ 
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otherwise covered by the instructions given. 
In Hardman v. Thurman, 121 Utah 143, 239 P.2d 215 (1951), 
the defendants claimed that the trial court erred in not giving 
certain instructions which correctly stated the law. This court 
found the refusal to instruct the jury not to be prejudicial 
error, stating: 
"Defendant's final contention is that the court 
erred in not giving certain instructions re-
quested by the defendants. We have carefully 
compared the requested instructions and the 
instructions given by the court and while it 
must be conceded that several of the requests 
denied correctly stated the law, nevertheless 
the substance thereof was given in the instruc-
tions of the court. Hence it was not error to 
to refuse the request of defendant. The court 
adequately instructed the jury on all matters so 
as to correctly present the defendant's theory 
of the case. We find no prejudicial error. 
239 P.2d at 219. 
Similar results have been reached in Muir v. Christensen, 
15 U.2d 182, 389 P.2d 734 (1964); McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 U.2d 
400, 346 P.2d 711 (1959); and Lee v. Howes, 548 P.2d 619 (Utah 
1976). In these cases the jury was sufficiently schooled in the 
applicable law to make a determination of the comparative negli-
gence of each party. The cases held that a refusal to give requested 
instructions was not error when, "the basic issues were fairly and 
intelligibly presented to the jury for its determination." 9 U.2d 
at 405. 
The defendant's requested instruction no. 18 originates 
from a Midvale City Ordinance valid at the time of the accident 
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but later repealed. Assuming, arguendo, that the requested 
tion correctly states the law, the trial court did not error 
refusing to give this instruction. The substance of the iru 
was otherwise given to the jury. 
The jury was instructed as to the applicable l~r 
the duties of each driver. These instructions, taken as a~ 
cover the substance of the defendant's requested instructi~ 
18. This instruction deals with the duty of the plaintiff wi: 
regard to speed and right of way. It is apparent from the~ 
verdict of the jury that the jury considered these factors i: 
assessing the forty per cent comparative negligence against· 
plaintiff. 
POINT III. 
THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE COURT'S 
EXAMINATION OF PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES. 
During the course of the trial, the trial judge ex, 
some of the plaintiff's as well as some of the defendant's~ 
nesses. This examination did not result in the defendant bei' 
denied a fair trial as asserted by the defendant. 
The defendant, in her brief, wishes to count the~ 
of questions asked of the plaintiff's witnesses and of the~ 
dant's witnesses and to equate the number of questions as~i 
prejudice. The defendant does not specify which particulu 
or questions tendered by the court caused the alleged prej~ 
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the fair trial. 
The questions asked by the court were intended to clarify 
testimony already given or requested. Defense counsel concurred 
that particular questions should be asked (TR8). The appendix to 
the defendant's brief which includes the questioning alleged to be 
improper deletes lines 13 and 14 of page 8 of the transcript. 
Also, the questions asked by the court aided in the presentation 
of the defense case (TRlO, Line 18 et.seq.). 
The plaintiff concurs with the defendant that State v. 
Mellen, 583 P. Zd 46 (Utah 1978) correctly states the law as so the 
judge's authority to examine witnesses. The court stated: 
"[The] judge should and normally does exercise 
restraint in examining witnesses, so that he 
does not unduly intrude into the trial or encroach 
upon the function of counsel .... Notwithstanding 
what has just been said, the judge does have a 
function beyond sitting as a comparatively 
silent monitor of proceedings. In order to 
discharge his responsibility of carrying out 
the above stated objective, it is within his 
prerogative to ask whatever questions of wit-
nesses as in his judgment [are] necessary or 
desirable to clarify, explain or add to the 
evidence as it relates to disputea-Tssues. 
583 p. Zd at 48. [Emphasis that of the defendant]. 
The defendant does not point out how the questions of 
the court went beyond clarification, explanation or addition to 
the evidence as it related to disputed issues. Therefore, the 
trial judge correctly exercised his discretion in his examination 
of witnesses. This examination was not error nor was it prejudicial 
to the defendant. 
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CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff's vehicle was an "immediate hazard" 
within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-72.H 
evidence did raise some conflict as to the location of the~ 
The court correctly submitted these issues to the jury forf 
decision. 
There is no basis for defendant to claim error bee 
the proper jury instruction no. 18 was not given. It is the 
of the trial judge to make a determination of the applicabiL 
and the necessity for that instruction. The underlying basi' 
that jury instruction was amply given in the other instructii 
the jury. The basic issues of this case were fairly and int 
presented to the jury for its determination. 
A judge should exercise restraint in examining ~t 
so that he does not unduly intrude into the function of co~ 
This is something that must be determined by the circumstuu 
some cases will require more questions by the trial judge ~ 
others. It is not only the trial judge's prerogative but a1' 
function, to ask questions of witnesses which he, in his fa: 
feels necessary or desirable to clarify, explain or add tot 
evidence as it relates to any of the disputed issues. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the judgme~~ 
lower court should be affirmed. 
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DATED this 29th day of November, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief 
to L. L. Summerhays, of Strong & Hanni, Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Appellant, 604 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
30th day of November, 1979. 
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